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Abstract
Greenland was colonized by Denmark in 1721. Although Denmark’s colonization had elements
of racism and economic exploitation, it was not violent. This project explores the long-term
effects of a paternalistic colonization on the establishment of extractive institutions and on social
well-being and cohesion. I examine ways in which Danish colonial policy, from 1721-1953, on
the one hand sought to “civilize” and modernize Greenlandic society and, on the other hand,
attempted to maintain traditional hunting practices for economic gain. These complex and
sometimes contradictory social engineering techniques of governance have been linked to longterm problems of Greenlandic identity. Greenland was officially decolonized in 1953, becoming
an independent nation within the Danish Realm. However, it is argued that this formal
decolonization paradoxically strengthened Denmark’s influence and paternalism in Greenland;
the 1950s and 1960s were known as the period of modernization or ‘Danization’ in which
Denmark centered Greenland’s economy on the cod fishing industry. Studies have linked this
modernization to social disruption: for example, Greenland has the highest suicide rate in the
world. There is suggestive evidence linking the rise in suicide rates in Greenland to aspects of
modernization, such as rises in urbanization rates. Although Greenland is no longer a colony of
Denmark today, they still rely on an annual subsidy from Denmark and the two nations are
politically intertwined. Greenland’s desire for self-reliance is becoming more globally debated as
the polar ice caps melting is making natural resources and minerals more accessible in
Greenland. While Greenland hopes revenues from these resources and minerals will aid their
desire for economic self-reliance, the mining of these resources raises several concerns
surrounding the exploitation of natural resources.
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Introduction
My title, “By Gifts One Makes Slaves”, comes from Peter Freuchen’s ethnographic work Book
of the Eskimo from the early 1900s.1 After accompanying a group of Inuit hunters on a walrus
hunt, Freuchen is given some of the walrus meat to eat. When Freuchen tries to thank the hunters
for the meat his expressions of gratitude are met with laughter and he quotes Sorqaq, “who had
been a great angakok and chief hunter in his day”, saying “In this country no one wishes to be
dependent upon others. Therefore, there is nobody who gives or gets gifts, for thereby you
become dependent. By gifts you make slaves just as with whips you make dogs!’” (1961, p.
154). With this quote, I want to draw attention to the more subtle effects of a paternalistic
colonization. Colonialism is typically associated with oppression by force, however military
force was absent from Greenland’s colonial experience, even in the beginning. Some argue that
Denmark was the ideal colonial ruler; their colonial policies and interventions were often
orchestrated “for the benefit of Greenlandic society” (Greenland Commission Report, 1960, p.
30). While such formulations may, in part, aim to disguise economic motivations of the Danish
colonial administration, this is not the whole story. In this project I will use Greenland to reflect
on how paternalism, the “restriction of the freedom and responsibilities of subordinates or
dependants in their supposed interest” (OED), affects the colonial experience. In this project, I
explore the long-term effects of paternalistic colonization on extractive institutions as well as
social well-being and cohesion. I look at ways in which Danish colonial policies created
institutions that were more focused on extracting resources than generating inclusive

1

Peter Freuchen first went to Greenland in 1906 on the Danish Expedition to Greenland. He married a Greenlandic
women and was one of the first Danish explorers to settle in a Greenlandic hunting community. In 1910 Freuchen
and Knud Rasmussen founded the Thule trading station.
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development. I examine Danish interventions that have been linked to different measures of
social disruption and social affliction, such as suicide rates.
In my background section I review theories on the motivations for colonization and the
emerging body of mainstream economic literature on the long-term effects of colonization.
While some theories of colonialism argue that colonizers were predominately economically
motivated, other scholars focus on the ‘moral’ motivations for colonization. The mainstream
economic literature emphasizes colonization’s effect on long-term development through its effect
on institutions. Next, I trace Greenland’s history from their colonization in 1721 to present-day
struggles for complete sovereignty; examining Denmark’s colonial motivations and the longterm effects of their interventions on Greenland’s economy and social structure. In my second
chapter, I briefly describe the argument that Denmark’s colonization of Greenland broke up this
pre-existing structure. While the argument that Denmark’s colonization of Greenland broke up
what potentially could have been a better way of organizing Greenland’s economy is interesting,
it is difficult to relate this to a discussion of Greenland’s current developments and political
struggles. In my third chapter, I analyze Denmark’s colonial policies and suggest ways in which
these policies might have had long-term effects on Greenlandic identity. During the colonial
period Denmark set up local boards, introduced legislation which regulated relationships
between Danes and Greenlanders, and brought Greenlanders to boarding houses in Denmark to
‘civilize’ them. Throughout this chapter, I examine how Danish colonial policies, on the one
hand, sought to ‘civilize’ and modernize the Greenlanders and, on the other hand, attempted to
maintain traditional hunting practices for economic gain. Scholars suggest that this social
engineering form of governance has had long-term effects on the conception of Greenlandic
identity (Rud 2014). In my fourth chapter, I analyze the period after the formal decolonization of
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Greenland, also known as the modernization period. I explore how Denmark’s focus on
extracting cod fish from Greenland in the 1950s and 60s changed the institutional structure in
Greenland; the focus on cod fishing necessitated rapid urbanization, created disruptions in
Greenland’s labor market and reinforced an economy centered on producing primary goods. In
my fifth chapter I look at Greenland’s economy today. Though Greenland has a high GDP per
capita, they have the highest suicide rate in the world. Then, I explore ways in which
Greenlandic could become economically self-sufficient. Although Greenland hasn’t been a
formal colony for 60 years, it still relies on an annual block grant from Denmark which accounts
for approximately 50% of its state budget. Greenland hopes revenues from natural resources and
minerals will help them achieve economic self-reliance, however, the exploitation of natural
resources raises many concerns.

8

Chapter 1: Background
Motivations for Colonialism
Colonialism is defined as “the policy or practice of acquiring full or partial political control over
another country, occupying it with settlers, and exploiting it economically”(OED). There are
many theories about the motivation for colonization; some of these theories view colonialism as
a predominantly economically motivated phenomenon, will others focus on the ‘moral’
motivations behind colonization. According to Eckstein (1991)'s Hobson-Lenin thesis, the
motivation for colonial expansion was the need to export capital and to protect these new oversea
expansions, often by force. Their thesis is based on the idea that European countries colonized in
the 1870s and 80s because their advanced industrial capitalism produced an excess of capital that
was unable to find any profitable outlet in the domestic economy. The argument assumes that
capitalism caused wealth disparities and that once wealth was accumulated among the upper
class, the lower class would under-consume and the upper class would need new markets to
invest their capital in (Eckstein, 1991). More contemporary dependency theory scholars have
made similar economically-based arguments, such as Andre Gunder Frank, who views
colonialism as necessary at a stage of capitalism to channel the accumulation of capital,
ultimately preventing the development of an autonomous economy within the controlled
territories (1978, p. 189).
The notion of the civilizing mission focuses, instead, on ‘moral’ motivations for
colonization, where colonizers feel the need to uplift the people they are colonized, typically
based on racist notions of superiority. Edward Said (1994)’s notion of Orientalism explains how
the West creates a specific view of the Orient as primitive, uncivilized and incapable of
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governing to justify their colonization of the Orient. Scholars such as Ann Fienup-Riordan
(1995), Kirsten Thisted (2002) and Lars Jensen (2015b) have applied Said’s notion of
orientalism to Greenland using the term ‘Eskimo-orientalism’ or ‘Arctic-orientalism’. Much like
Said’s analysis claims that the West creates a specific view of Orientals as primitive, uncivilized
and incapable of governing themselves, Fienup-Riordan claims the West represents the Inuit
people as “‘pure primitive’: peaceful, happy, childlike“ to justify their colonization of Inuit
territories. However, whether these paternalistic notions were simply used to disguise economic
motivations or were a genuine, ill-founded desire to help the colonized is debated. Alice Conklin
(1998), for example, examines Western belief in the moral legitimacy of colonialism. Conklin
analyzes the relationship between Republican France’s emancipatory discourses and their
colonial policies in West Africa, claiming that the desire to civilize goes beyond rhetorical
justifications for economic exploitation. While Conklin does not dispute the negative
consequences of colonialism, she argues that often colonizers did believe in their the moral
legitimacy of their mission; she writes “the faith of yesterday's empire builders in the moral
legitimacy of their enterprise was all but absolute” (1998, p. 419).

Long-term Effects of Colonization in Economics
In the last decade, a considerable body of research looking at colonialism’s impact on long-term
development has been established in mainstream economics. This body of research places
colonization’s impact on institutions at the center of these long-term effects.
In this section, I will first look at how economic models can account for colonialism’s
long-term effects on the colonies’ development. I then, examine general claims about whether
colonialism had good or bad effects on long-term development and possible channels of
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influence. I will look at claims that colonialism alters colonies’ institutional structure to focus on
extracting resources from the colony and arguments about colonization’s long-term effects on the
colonies’ legal institutions, financial institutions, education and health institutions, infrastructure,
the role the market plays in society and informal institutions.

Modeling Colonialism’s Impact on the Economy: Multiple Equilibria and Path Dependence
It is not clear from classical economic models why colonization would have an impact on longterm development. This is because neoclassical growth models envision a world with only one
unique equilibrium, failing to account for path dependency. We can see this illustrated in the
Solow model, the neoclassical growth model. The Solow Model looks at the determinants of
long-run economic growth, showing that the only source of long-run growth is technological
change. In the Solow Model, there is a unique steady level of capital and income per worker; any
deviations from this steady state are considered temporary. The Solow model predicts that, if the
market is left to its own devices, poor countries will grow faster than richer countries, eventually
converging at a steady state. This model does not account for how a historical event can alter the
subsequent path of economic development.
Several scholars have critiqued this notion of one unique equilibrium, expanding the
neoclassical model from having one unique optimal equilibrium to a model with many possible
equilibria (Nunn, 2007; Murphy, Sheifer and Vishney, 1993; Acemoglu, 1995; Mehlum, Moene,
and Torvik, 2003). For example, Nunn (2007) develops a model for post-colonial development in
Africa. In this model, Nunn claims that the slave trade and Africa’s colonial history shifted
Africa’s growth trajectory to a lower income level. Nunn claims that a long period of severe
extraction caused not only a temporary shift to a lower income level but a shift to another stable
equilibrium at a lower income level. In these models there are multiple equilibria, illustrating the
11

fact that historical events have lasting effects that lead some countries down different economic
trajectories than others; they highlight the existence of path dependency.

Good or Bad?
While economists agree colonialism has impacted current economic outcomes significantly,
there is great debate over whether this impact has been good or bad. While many economists
identify ways in which colonization negatively impacts the colonies’ institutions in the longterm, others argue that colonial rule can have positive long-term effects on the colonies’
development.
Grier (1999), for example, claims that colonies that were held for longer periods of time
perform better than those that were held for shorter periods of time. His arguments seem to be in
line with colonizers who felt the need to spread the civilizing mission. Grier suggests that
colonizers transferred knowledge and technology to the colonies, aiding their long-term
development. However, Grier only identifies a correlation between length of colonization and
subsequent development, relying on OLS estimates. This correlation is not surprising, as
colonizers are more likely to keep colonies that are more productive and the factors that make the
colonizers more likely to keep the colony also create greater levels of economic growth now.
Iyer (2010) compares the long-term effects of Britain’s direct versus indirect rule across
415 districts in India. While Iyer does not address what India would be like in the absence of
colonial rule, she does determine that less intervention by the colonizer led to better development
in the long-term. While Grier (1999)’s analysis relies on OLS estimates, Iyer identifies a more
convincing identification strategy. Iyer addresses this endogeneity problem by taking advantage
of a British policy, known as the ‘Doctrine of Lapse’. The ‘Doctrine of Lapse’ was a policy
which allowed the British to annex Indian states when the native ruler died of natural causes
12

without a natural heir. As Iyer points out, Britain generally annexed the most productive states.
However, since Indian states that were annexed under the ‘Doctrine of Lapse’ were not annexed
because they were more productive, the annexation of these districts should be exogenous to
levels of development in the districts today; the difference between Iyer’s OLS and IV estimates
support this idea. Using the ‘Doctrine of Lapse’ as an instrumental variable, Iyer finds that
districts under direct rule now have less access to public goods such as schools, health centers
and roads than districts with greater sovereignty.
Further, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) show that we see a reversal of fortunes
among countries colonized by Europeans, suggesting that the colonial intervention had
detrimental effects on colonies’ long-term development. Acemoglu et al. document that, of the
colonized countries, the ones that were the richest in 1500 are now the poorest. Acemoglu et al.
argue that in colonies with high population density, colonizers will set up extractive institutions
to reap the benefits of the colony’s resources that create prosperity in that region. 2 Whereas if the
colony was less prosperous there was less for the colonizers to exploit and the colonies’
development path would be less affected. This correlation is the opposite in countries that were
not colonized; in countries that were not colonized high pre-colonial population density is
correlated with high levels of GDP per capita today. The difference between countries which
were colonized and those that weren’t, highlights the detrimental effects that colonialism had on
the colonies’ long-term development.
In the following section, I review the literature pinpointing the channels through which
colonization affects a country’s long-term development. I look at colonization’s effect on longterm development through its effects on the colonies’ institutions.
2

Huillery (2008) tested for a reversal of fortunes within districts of former French West Africa and found
no evidence of a reversal in French West Africa. This points to the difficulty in generalizing the effects of
colonialism across vastly different colonies and colonizers.
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Institutions
The importance of institutions for economic development has been well recognized since
Douglass North (1991)’s seminal contribution to the field of economics. North (1991) defines
institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social
relations” (p. 97). This includes both formal institutions, such as constitutions, property rights
and laws, and informal institutions, such as sanctions, taboos, customs and traditions. North
highlights the importance of institutions for the economy, claiming that institutions are the
incentive structures of a nation’s economy. Many scholars suggest that colonial rule affects longterm economic development through its effect on the colony’s institutions (e.g., La Porta et al.,
1997, 1998 and 2008; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Nunn, 2009). In
this section, I review econometric studies that claim that colonizers set up institutions that aim to
extract resources from the colonies and suggest different impacts colonization has on the
colonies’ legal institutions, property rights, education and health institutions, infrastructure,
regulation of the market and informal institutions.

Extractive Institutions
Colonization negatively impacts the colonies’ long-term development because colonizers set up
institutions focused on extracting the colonies’ resources, rather than institutions focused on
creating inclusive long-term development.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) show how extractive institutions set up by colonizers were
harmful to the colony’s long-term development. Acemoglu et al. use data on settler mortality
rates to show that when mortality rates are high and the colonizers don’t settle, colonizers set up
extractive institutions which hinder long-term development. Whereas, when mortality rates are
low in the colonies, colonizers will settle in the colony and set up more inclusive institutions
14

which are more conducive to long-term development. In former colonies, such as the United
States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, where colonizers settled, the settlers demanded more
inclusive institutional frameworks in these countries. Acemoglu et al. claim that if the colonizers
settle in their colony, they will create institutions that protect private property and provide checks
and balances against government expropriation. If a country has good institutions (according to
Acemoglu this means more secure property rights and less distortionary policies) there will be
more investment in physical and human capital, which will lead to higher levels of GDP.
Acemoglu et al.’s measure of institutional quality today is an index measuring protection against
appropriation. About New Zealand Acemoglu et al. write: "the enormous boom in public
investment after 1870 ... was an attempt to build up an infrastructure ... to maintain high living
standards in a country where voters expected politicians actively to promote their economic
welfare" (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p. 225). This is in sharp contrast to the colonial experience in
Latin America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in Asia and Africa during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If the colonizers don’t settle, they instead set up
extractive institutions which concentrate power in the hands of a small elite and create a high risk
of expropriation for the rest of the population. In Latin America, for example, the main objective
of the Spanish and the Portuguese colonization was to obtain gold and other valuables. Soon
after the conquest, the Spanish crown granted rights to land and labor (the encomienda) and set
up a complex mercantilist system of monopolies and trade regulations to extract resources from
the colonies. This discourages investment and hinders the colonies’ long-term development.
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) claim that historical differences in endowments in the
Americas have affected their levels of inequality today. They explain that in colonies with crops
that rely on large labor resources, colonizers created institutions which promoted unequal

15

distributions of human capital, wealth and political power to make the exploitation of labor
easier. This resulted in domestic institutions that protected the elite and restricted the rest of the
population in the economy. Engerman and Sokoloff show how institutions made to
systematically exploit labor hinder the long-term development of the colonies, resulting in lower
levels of economic performance in these colonies today.
Acemoglu et al. show that institutions set up were focused on extracting resources from
the colonies, Engerman and Sokoloff highlight that colonizers set up institutions that supported
inequality to support exploitative labor practices. Making broad generalizations about the bad
effects of colonization across widely different colonial contexts is not an easy task; cultural
norms in the colonizer and colonies and specific colonial policies introduced all differ. However,
colonization is typically economically motivated to a certain degree, meaning that the colonizers’
aim in establishing colonial rule is to effectively extract resources from their colony. Although it
can be hard to generalize what type of institutions a colonizer sets up, Acemoglu et al. and
Engerman and Sokoloff point to the general incentive structure in place for colonizers. Although
colonial policies differ greatly from country to country, the incentives in place for the colonizers
are not conducive to establishing institutions that aim to create long-term prosperity for the
indigenous. Most often colonizers are attempting to extract resources or labor from their colonies
and thereby set up institutions that aid this extraction and aren’t conducive to the colonies’ longterm development. In the case of Greenland we will see how Denmark focused Greenland’s
economy on extracting cod fish in chapter 4, creating institutions that focused on extracting
rather than generating inclusive development.

16

Legal Origin
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Sheleifer, and Vishny (2008) investigate how the legal origin of the
colonizer changes the long-term effects on the colonies’ development. La Porta et al. examines
the different effects of legal systems based on British common law, versus French, German and
Scandinavian civil law. They claim that legal systems based on British common law offer greater
investor protection and less government regulation than countries with legal systems based on
civil law. La Porta et al. claim is that colonies colonized by Anglo-Saxon common law countries
are better off than colonies colonized by civil law countries, as common law supports a marketbased form of capitalism whereas civil law supports a more state-centered form of capitalism.
These conclusions add to a larger argument about the interplay between the role of state and the
market in creating long-term development. Many scholars, such as Chang (2011) argue against
La Porta’s conclusions, claiming that liberalized institutions are not necessarily more conducive
to long-term development. La Porta et al. is significant as it points out that the long-term effects
of colonization change based on attributes of the colonizer. This is different from Engerman and
Sokoloff (2002) and Acemoglu (2001), who look at how the long-term effects of colonization
changed based on attributes of the colony.
Greenland’s high GDP per capita contradicts La Porta et al. (2008)’s analysis, as
Greenland was colonized by a civil law country but has high levels of GDP per capita for a
former colony. La Porta et al. (2008) claims that a country colonized by a civil law country, like
Denmark, should have a lower standard of living today than former colonies colonized by a
common law country. While Greenland’s average GDP per capita from 1990-2017 was
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$30,103.69, the average GDP per capita of former colonies from this period is $6,389.651.3 It
would be interesting to examine how Greenland’s legal system has affected their economy and
uncover why Greenland is an outlier in the La Porta’s findings. It would also be interesting to see
how more holistic measures of development such as HDI stack up to La Porta et al.’s theory
about legal origins. Do countries colonized by more market-focused common law countries also
have higher levels of health and education?

Critique of the Neoclassical Literature
Chang (2011) critiques the mainstream economists (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001 and La Porta et
al. 2008) focus on colonialism’s effects on property rights. The mainstream institutional
literature implies that property rights are key to high levels of economic development; Acemoglu
et al. (2001) claim that colonies where colonizers set up extractive institutions have weaker
property rights both then and today and thereby lower levels of economic development today. La
Porta et al. (2008) argue that colonies where colonizers set up common law institutions are better
off today than colonies where colonizers set up civil law, because common law countries
promoted liberalized institutions, creating greater security of property rights. Chang (2011),
however, claims that La Porta et al. and Acemoglu et al.’s emphasis on property rights implies a
distrust of the public sector’s ability to improve the country’s economic development and a
preference towards market fundamentalism. Chang argues that the field of economic
development is overly focused on maximizing market freedoms. He claims that a truly free
market is impossible to achieve and an overemphasis on attempting to achieve a free market is
harmful.

3

This data on GDP per capita was taken from the World Bank. Both numbers are measured in constant
2010 US$. The calculations were done by me.
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Some scholars discuss the importance of who is given property rights. Banerjee and Iyer
(2005) investigate this in their examination of the long-term effects of colonial land tenure
system in India. They find that districts in which property rights in land were given to the
cultivators of the land now perform better than districts in which property rights were given to
landlords. Other scholars express concern that strong property rights can also be used to enhance
large corporations, also known as the ‘technostructure’ (Galbriath, 1958). Galbraith suggests that
we should be less concerned about an overreaching government and more concerned about a
concentration of power among big firms. He calls those who control big firms the
“technostructure”. He also criticizes mainstream economics for not incorporating the effects of
large firms into its analyses of capitalism.

Persistent Effects of Investment in Education, Health and Infrastructure
Scholars such as Bolt and Bezemer (2008) and Huillery (2009) suggest that colonial investment
in education, health and infrastructure have significant and persistent effects on the colonies’
long-term development. Bolt and Bezemer find a positive correlation between colonial education
levels and current income across African countries. Huillery finds differences in colonial
investments in education, health and infrastructure in French West Africa had large and
persistent effects on current education and health outcomes and access to electricity, water, and
fuel in French West Africa today. Both of these econometric findings suggest that if colonizers
choose not to invest in education, health and infrastructure, this lack of investment has long-term
effects on the colonies’ development. As the colonial relationship is typically an exploitative
relationship, the colonizers are less likely to invest in education, health and infrastructure than a
sovereign government. This means colonialism leaves many colonies without the necessary
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infrastructure and educational and health institutions, putting them on a different developmental
path than countries that weren’t colonized.

Informal Institutions
There have been some attempts to understand ways in which colonization can affect cultural
norms of behavior. Economists understand informal institutions or cultural norms to be
important as the same economic institutions function very differently in different cultural
contexts. Fields such as anthropology, psychology and sociology have a more comprehensive
conception of the micro-foundations of culture.
Many scholars point to colonization’s long-term effects on levels of trust in the colony.
Guido Tabellini (2010) considers the implications of trust and other cultural norms for long-term
development, while both Tabellini (2010) and Nunn (2008) consider the historical determinants
of trust. Tabellini (2010) claims that ‘culture’ is an intermediary between good institutions and
higher levels of development. He defines culture as levels of trust, respect for others and belief
that there is a link between effort and economic success. In other words, Tabellini suggests that
on average the citizens in countries with low literacy rates and bad political institutions will have
lower levels of trust, less respect for others and less faith that individual effort leads to economic
success. He uses literacy rates in the end of the 19th century and political institutions as
instrumental variables for ‘culture’ and finds that countries with higher illiteracy rates and worse
political institutions have lower levels of trust, less respect for others and less faith in the
individual.
Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle and Schwarz (1996) point to colonization’s long-term effects on
the informal institutions. Cohen et al. show how historical differences between the Northern and
Southern United States have created a culture of honor in South, but not the North. The Celts,
20

who had been herders since prehistoric times and had never engaged in large-scale agriculture,
settled in the South, while the North was settled by groups with a farming background. Cohen et
al. (1996) argue that the herding society in the South historically had a weak state and the
protection of private property was left to the individual. They argue that since the protection of
private property was left to the individual, a stronger sense of honor and willingness to use
aggression to protect one’s private property persists today.
Nunn (2008) considers the historical determinants of trust by investigating whether the
trans-Atlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades created a culture of mistrust in Africa. He finds a
strong negative relationship between the individuals’ reported trust in others and the number of
slaves taken from the individual’s group during slave trades. Nunn (2008) considers two possible
channels through which the slave trade could have adversely affected trust: by altering cultural
norms, making them inherently less trusting and by worsening domestic legal and political
institutions, creating less trust among individuals in the region. To differentiate between these
two channels, Nunn creates two measures of slave export. The first measures the average number
of slaves taken away from the individual's ethnic group, isolating the adverse effects on cultural
norms, while the second measures the average number of slaves taken away from the
individual’s geographic location, isolating the adverse effect on institutions in the region. The
adverse effects on trust by changing cultural norms are internalized by the individual to the and
thereby arguably internal within an ethnic group but geographically mobile, while institutions are
geographically immobile and external to the individual. Therefore, by differentiating between
ethnic group and geographic region, he is able to differentiate between effects on cultural norms,
beliefs and domestic institutions. Nunn (2008) concludes that the slave trade had adverse effects
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on trust through both channels, but that the cultural channel adversely affects trust about twice as
much as the institutional channel.
Becker, Boeckh, Hainz and Woessmann (2015) claim that the Habsburg Empire created
greater trust and less corruption. Becker et al. show that areas, where the Habsburg Empire ruled,
have higher levels of trust today. To determine levels of trust Becker et al. used survey data
asking whether people trusted other people and institutions, including local public services, such
as courts and police, central state institutions, such as political parties, the parliament, the
government/cabinet of ministers, the presidency and the armed forces, and non-state institutions,
such as trade unions.
Ultimately, the literature shows that colonial institutions differ greatly and have had very
different lasting effects on long-term economic outcomes in former colonies. In this project I will
attempt to look at the particularities of the Greenland case. I will be looking at specific colonial
policies in Greenland and identifying if and how the policies were harmful at the time and for
long-term economic development. Unlike most of the mainstream economic literature, I will be
focusing the long-term effects of a paternalistic colonization. Throughout my analysis of
Greenland, I pay particular attention to the creation of extractive institutions, as defined by
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002).
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Timeline of Greenland’s Colonial History

“The colonial administration's interferences in Greenland’s social structure was
economically determined and had dire effects on social and political relations”4
(Viemose 1976, p. 13).

4

My translation
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Chapter 2: Pre-Colonial Greenland5
The Inuit came to Greenland in 900 and are the forefathers of the current Greenlandic
population. They started in Thule but spread in the 1300s as their population increased. In the
pre-colonial period, the Inuit lived in groups that organized communally and lived off hunting
and fishing. Viemose (1976) describes the way in which the Inuit collectively produced the
means of subsistence to survive, referring to this as the ‘Arctic mode of production’. The groups
were made up of several joined families. In different parts of Greenland, the size, composition
and mobility of the groups differed due to differences in animals to hunt. For example, Viemose
explains that in the summer the different groups were mobile, while they had fixed residence in
the winter. In the summer the Inuit used kayaks to hunt seals, walruses and smaller whales,
requiring a more mobile living situation. In the fall they primarily fished trout and hunted
reindeer. In the winter they hunted seals on the ice. The mode of production varied in different
parts of Greenland due to differences in climate and animals available to hunt. Feminist scholars,
such as Jessen Williamson (2011) and Arnfred and Pederson(2015) have claimed that there was a
complementary division of labor between men and women in pre-colonial Greenland. According
to these authors, men did the hunting and women prepared the meat and made furs and used
hides to fashion kayak covers. The women were also in charge of the partition and distribution of
the catch. These authors claim that while there was a division of labor between men and women,
neither was superior because the spheres were dependent on each other’s labor (Jessen
Williamson 2011; Arnfred and Pederson 2015).
Each ‘settlement group’ would typically have communal meals after a big hunt. Viemose
highlights the importance of these communal meals, explaining that they were a time to make
5

The information presented in this section is based primarily on Viemose (1977), Gulløv and Toft (2017), Jessen
William (2011) and Arnfred and Pederson (2015)’s descriptions of pre-colonial Greenland.
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community decisions, including how to “punish and resocialize lawbreakers” (Viemose, 1976, p.
12) in the community. Conflict resolution was typically done communally through drum circles.
As an employee of the Danish colonial trading department (RGTD), Henric Glahn, describes in
his diaries: “If one person has harmed another person, the offended party will wait until they can
meet in drumming. At the first opportunity, when a group of people get together to have a jolly
time, he will take the drum, enter the circle of people, and drumming, jumping, singing he will
relate for those present what has happened, criticizing and making fun of his opponent. The other
one will defend himself in the same way, telling in song his version of the story (Glahn, 1921,
quoted in Arnfred and Pedersen, 2015). Conflicts were resolved communally, as the spectators of
the drum circle would decide who’d won the argument.
Paganism was the main religion in pre-colonial Greenland. The shaman, known as
angakoq (plural: angakuq), played an important role as the contact person between the Inuit and
nature. The shamans encouraged good treatment of nature and animals and ensured that people
didn’t break rules of the community. As Greenlandic native and scholar of Greenland Karla
Jessen Williamson explains: “The Inuit believe that nuna [the land] and animals not only possess
immortal souls and awareness (… ) but that their soul and awareness are equal to those of a
human being. (… ) The life of human beings on nuna is possible because of the courtesy
extended by nuna and the animals. (Jessen Williamson, 2011, p. 44– 45, quoted in Arnfred and
Pedersen 2015). The position of angakoq was not inherited, but rather given to a respected
member of the community; for this reason, the shamans were often great hunters, but did not
have to be. Both men and women could be shamans.

Breaking Up Pre-existing Structures
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Different scholars argue that Denmark’s colonization of Greenland broke up the communal
structure and pre-existing trade network in Greenland. Viemose (1976) argues that Denmark’s
colonization of Greenland broke up Greenland’s traditional hunter-gatherer economies, which
were based on egalitarian values and common ownership. This idea draws on Marx and Engels’
idea that traditional hunter-gatherer societies were a form of primitive communism. Viemose
argues that part of the reason Denmark’s colonial rule of Greenland lasted for as long as it did
was that Denmark intentionally broke up the communal structure of Inuit society and opposed
any attempts by the Greenlandic people to organize, making it harder for the Greenlanders to
collectively oppose Danish rule throughout history. Further, Arnfred and Pedersen (2015) argue
that Denmark’s colonization of Greenland imposed European hierarchies of gender and morals
of sexuality. While male and female labor were mutually dependent on each other in pre-colonial
Greenland, labor policies in colonial Greenland opened up more job opportunities for men than
women. As Arnfred and Pedersen explain: “Some men …. had the opportunity to gain an
education and jobs in the context of the Mission and/or Trade (as bestillingsmen), while the
option for women during the early phase of colonization - with the exception of an education as
midwife for a select few - was unskilled jobs as kiffat (housemaids) in Danish homes (2015, p.
293). Further, there seemed to be an indifference to gender in spiritual contexts in pre-colonial
Greenland, as the angakoq could be either a man or a woman. The colonial administration
disapproved of the indigenous spiritual practices in general, as Arnfred and Pedersen (2015)
explain: “collective relations of sharing are broken down, as is the spirituality of relations
between human beings and nature” (p. 292).
Viemose (1976) also argues that there was a fairly extensive pre-existing trade network
between North, South and possibly East Greenland by the start of Denmark’s colonization of
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Greenland in 1721. According to Viemose, legal institutions to deal with concerns of trade, such
as disagreements between different trade parties, were also being developed in pre-colonial
Greenland. While the arguments that Denmark’s colonization of Greenland broke up what
potentially could have been a better way of organizing Greenland’s economy is interesting, it is
difficult to relate this to a discussion of Greenland’s current developments and political struggles.
We can’t create the counterfactual of what Greenland’s economy would be like if Denmark
never colonized Greenland.
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Chapter 3: Denmark’s Colonization of Greenland
Historical Context6
There were many expeditions from Denmark to Greenland before Denmark’s colonization of
Greenland in 1721. In 1473 King Christian I of Denmark sent an expedition to Greenland,
wanting to renew contact between Greenland and Denmark. However, the expedition landed on
an uninhabitable part of the Southeastern coast of Greenland. Between 1500 and 1581 there were
several expeditions in search of the North Passage, organized by Danes, Portuguese, Germans,
English and Fae. King Christian IV of Denmark felt that the British and Dutch were taking the
lead on the expeditions in the Greenlandic waters in search of the North Passage. To establish
Denmark’s place in the expeditions, Christian IV sent several ships to explore Greenland. As
evidence of the expedition’s success, the expedition took several Greenlanders back to
Copenhagen with them as detainees. In 1721 Hans Egede re-established the connection between
Scandinavia and Greenland; this is known as the beginning of Greenland’s modern colonial
history. King Frederik IV of Denmark funded Egede’s trips to establish trade activity. Hans
Egede was a Danish-Norwegian Lutheran missionary, often referred to as the ‘Apostle of
Greenland’. His expeditions to Greenland aimed to do missionary work and to open up trade
relations between Denmark and Greenland.
In 1774 the Royal Greenland Trading Department, run by the Danish colonial state, was
granted trade monopoly. In 50 years following the colonization of Greenland a number of trade
colonies were established with an integrated statutory mission. The Danish administration

6

The information presented in this section is based primarily on Frandsen et al. (2017), Taagholt (1991), Egede
(1818), Viemose (1977), Manniche (2002), Rud (2014), Gad (2014), Thomsen (1998) and Marquardt (1998/9)’s
descriptions of Denmark’s colonization of Greenland.
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justified the trade monopoly by claiming that the Greenlandic population was not ready for the
modernization process that free trade would prompt (Manniche 2002; Rud 2014; Thomsen 1998;
Thuesen 2007). However, many scholars today suggest that the trade monopoly imposed by the
Danish colonial administration was driven by economic motivations, rather than a desire to
protect the Greenlandic society. Gad (2014), for example, points out that when establishing the
Royal Greenland Trading Department Denmark took several measures to weed out competition,
such as Dutch and Basque whalers and Norwegian hunters, to ensure Denmark had a monopoly
on Greenlandic resources. This implies that the protectionist policies put in place by the colonial
administration were not a thought-through consideration of how free trade might harm
Greenlandic society and identity, but rather a desire to monopolize Greenlandic resources.
Although Greenland was not the most fruitful colony in terms of resources, Greenland was a
good place to hunt sea mammals and blubber was an important product in Europe at the time.
Blubber was used as fuel for things like street lamps and trains. Street lamps all over Europe
were fueled by blubber that was ‘boiled out of sea mammals’ (Viemose 1976, p. 18) that had
been caught in Greenland. Both the missionaries and the merchants viewed colonization as
necessary for their separate goals in Greenland. While the missionaries and merchants had
different interests in Greenland, Hans Egede’s diary suggests that relations were good between
the missionaries and the merchants (Egede, 1818, p. 7).
In 1782 Denmark set up a direct channel of control from the Danish monarchy in
Copenhagen to the colonial districts in Greenland. Two inspectorates were set up, one in
Northern Greenland (in Godhavn) and another in Southern Greenland (in Godthåb). At that time
the individual colonies were run very differently, in part because the harsh weather did not allow
regular contact between the districts. The inspectorates were administered by the direktorat for
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the Royal Greenland trade department in Copenhagen and each inspectorate monitored councils
in Greenland (For detailed descriptions of the evolution of the administrative structure see
Viemose 1976). The first state law in Greenland was also introduced in 1782; this piece of
legislation was known as The Instruction of 1782. During the colonial period, Greenland’s first
state law, The Instruction of 1782, was introduced, money was introduced to Greenland in 1804
and local boards were introduced in the beginning of the 1860s.

Analysis of Denmark’s Colonial Policies
Danish colonial policy in Greenland has been interpreted in two ways (Forchhammer 2006; Rud
2014). The first view praises Danish colonial policies, claiming that they created a more
democratic colony than other colonizers. The second view focuses on the ways in which Danish
colonial policies were designed to extract resources from Greenland.
The first view glorifies Danish policies, claiming that Denmark’s colonial policies were
generally better than other forms of colonization (see for example Fleischer 2003; Oldendow
1955). This interpretation focuses on institutions established in Greenland during the period as
facilitating the first steps towards a democratic Greenland.
The second interpretation of Denmark’s colonial policies focuses on Denmark’s desire to
exploit Greenland’s resources. This view argues that Danish colonial policy was purposefully
orchestrated to get the Greenlanders to produce as much as possible (Viemose 1976; Thomsen
1998; Marquardt 1998/99; Rud 2014). This view is in line with Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2001) who claim that colonizers that don’t settle in their colony will set up extractive
institutions rather than inclusive institutions. Although Acemoglu et al.’s data does not include
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Greenland, we can see from other sources such as Petersen (2016, p. 125) that the settlement rate
was low in Greenland. According to Acemoglu et al. “the main purpose of the extractive state
was to transfer as much of the resources of the colony to the colonizer” (2001, p. 1370). While
Acemoglu et al. don’t go into detail about the extractive institutions, their examples of extractive
colonial policies are focused on exploitation by force. Violence and forced exploitation of labor
was absent from the Denmark’s colonization of Greenland. However, scholars of Greenland
argue that this is not because of an absence of the motivation of economic exploitation, but
because violence would not have been the most effective way to extract resources from
Greenland (see for example Rud 2014 and Viemose 1976). It was in Denmark’s economic
interest to keep Greenlandic hunting practices alive. Rud (2014) and Thomsen (1998) claim that
the financial success of Denmark’s colonization project came to depend on ‘traditional’
Greenlandic goods such as seal fur and blubber. They needed Greenlanders’ expertise in
traditional hunting and thereby needed the Greenlandic population to willingly hunt in order to
have a productive economy. In this chapter I will examine Danish colonial policy through the
lens of colonial governmentality, investigating ways in which Danish colonial policy was
orchestrated to encourage a profitable colony. I will look at how the Danish colonial
administration established a labor hierarchy, through the creation of local boards
(‘forstanderskabet’), which encouraged hunting by making productive hunters a class of elites
and incorporated them into the edifices of Danish power. I also examine how the Danish
government monitored relationships between Danes and Greenlanders, encouraging mixed
marriages to create a small class of elite, allied Greenlanders. To accomplish this Danish colonial
policies mobilized a sense of Greenlandic ‘tradition’. I examine the tug of war in Danish colonial
policy between wanting to maintain traditional hunting practices and desires to civilize the
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population, and I suggest ways in which the social engineering involved in Danish colonial
policy has had long-term effects on Greenlandic identity.

Colonial Governmentality
Governmentality is a Foucauldian term, which examines ways in which government policy is
used to shape the actions of the governed; governmentality is typically associated with willing
participation of the governed rather than disciplinary force. Foucault’s work on governmentality
focuses on liberalism as political rationality (Foucault, 1991). However, other scholars have
employed the notion of ‘colonial governmentality’ to other colonial contexts to examine ways in
which colonial policies socially engineer their subjects to fulfill the needs of the colonizers. Scott
(1995) was the first scholar to use the concept of colonial governmentality in his work on British
colonial policy in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). He writes “What was at stake in the governmental
redefinition and reordering of the colonial world was the design of institutions so that, following
only their own self-interest, natives would do what they ought” (Scott, 1995, p. 214). Thomas
(1994) examines British colonial policy in Fiji, through the lens of colonial governmentality,
focusing on how the culture of the colonized was mobilized in Britain’s colonial policy.
Rud (2014) applies the notion of colonial governmentality to Denmark’s colonial policy
in Greenland. Rud argues that the Danish colonial administration utilized the concept of a
Greenlandic ‘tradition’ in their efforts to govern the behavior of the Greenlanders. Viemose
(1976) argues that Denmark intentionally influenced Greenlandic perception of the colonial
administration to gain implicit, rather than explicit, control over colonies in Greenland and avoid
a major uprising; he writes “Not many colonizers have managed to take advantage of a colony’s
natural resource and population over 250 years without a major uprising at the local level” (p. 7,
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my translation). Rud (2014) claims that Danish colonial policy was unique in“the way in which
the notion of an authentic Greenlandic tradition was utilized tactically by the colonial
authorities” (p. 554). This meant that the Royal Greenland Trading company attempted to limit
contact between Greenlandic hunters and the Europeans, as they did not want to change the
Greenlandic hunting practices. As Rud writes: “The colonial authorities believed that the more
westernized or ‘civilized’ the Greenlanders became, the less skilled they would be in ‘traditional’
seal hunting” (p. 556). Wilhjelm (1997) notes that both catechist training colleges integrated
cultural hunting practices into their curriculum; “The headmaster will see to it that the college
students in their spare time studiously practise the Greenlandic occupation; he will watch over
their conduct and expel the negligent and the indecent when warnings prove fruitless” (Anon.
1846, quoted by Wilhjelm, 1997, p. 304). Rud (2014), Marquardt (1999) and Thomsen (1998)
claim that these new policies made all occupations, other than seal hunting, ‘un-Greenlandic’.
Rud writes that “the seal hunters were singled out as the essence of Greenlandic culture” (2014,
p. 361); seal hunting was even termed the ‘natural occupation’. To bias the Greenlandic people’s
incentives towards seal hunting “the best hunters were singled out to be leaders and received
economic benefits, whereas fishing and wage labour were deemed unnatural for Greenlanders”
(Rud, 2014, p. 562).
We see the Danish administration's attempts to create the correct mixture of civilizing
and maintaining traditional practices for economic gain. Rud (2014) explains that at the
beginning of the 19th century there were conflicting interests between the “traditional wing” and
the “modernist wing”. While some colonial officials and anthropologists pushed notions of
tradition, other colonial officials and missionaries sought to modernize, westernize and civilize
the Greenlandic society and individuals (Manniche 1998/99; Rud 2014). The traditional vs.
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modernist wing is mirrored in the difference between the two catechists’ training colleges started
in Greenland in 1844. The first college in Nuuk (then known by its Danish name: Godthåb) was
skeptical of the western influence, while the second in Ilulissat (then known by its Danish name:
Jakobshavn) was open to Western influence (Manniche 2002). The college in Nuuk did not, for
example, encourage their students to learn Danish, whereas the college in Ilulissat did (Manniche
1998/9; Wilhjelm 1997; Rud 2014).

Forstanderskabet

Figure 1: A local board in Qaqortoq (previously known as Julianehåb)
Source: Nyeboe, Marius Ib. Forstanderskab ved Julianehåb. 1900. Arktisk Institut Fotosamling.
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At the beginning of the 1860s, Denmark began to effectivize the colonial activities by
incorporating Greenlanders into the colonial administration. The proposal to reform the colonial
administration was made by Hinrich J. Rink, the inspector of the southern province of
Greenland, C.E. Janssen, the headmaster of the college in Nuuk, S. Kleinschmidt, a Moravian
missionary and J. F. T. Lindorff, a doctor. The reform, known as the local board arrangement
(forstanderskabsordningen), established local boards in each colonial district with the aim of
creating new institutions based on Greenlandic tradition. The main idea of this proposal was to
exploit Greenlanders’ knowledge about Greenland and establish a support class of Greenlanders
who, through various forms of bribery, could be made loyal agents for the colonial
administration. The long-term goal was, as Rink puts it, to create “a real subordinationrelationship” (1874, p. 33).
The forstanderskab was essentially an administrative local council in each district. While
these local councils consisted mainly of Danish officials, they also incorporated a few chosen
Greenlanders. These Greenlandic representatives were known as paarsisoqs. Being a paarsisoqs
was a position of power as paarsisoqs were compensated handsomely. At the top of the
forstanderskab hierarchy was a Danish priest, the colonial official who dealt with trade in and out
of the district, a Danish doctor and a Danish trade assistant. The colonial administration
strategically choose the best Greenlandic seal hunters to be the Greenlandic representatives in the
councils. Good hunters were made leaders on the local boards but never given higher status than
colonial officials. The boards and decisions made by the boards were always overseen by
superior colonial officials (Rink, 1982). In this way the Danish administration created a
hierarchy in the Greenlandic society, with seal hunters at the top, to promote the economic
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interests of the Danish administration. Rud claims that the local boards reflect the Danish
colonial administration’s desire to “reshape Greenlanders’ self-interest” (p. 563).
The Danish colonial administration used the local council to incentivize hunting by
creating the perception that the Greenlandic hunters who were made members of the local
councils were part of an elite class. The high status of the men in the photo both serve to make
natives respect the higher class and want to be a part of the higher class. Creating a desire among
the natives to become part of the council benefitted the colonial administration in two ways.
Firstly, this incentivized people to be better hunters, as only the best hunters were chosen to be
on the council. Incentivizing better hunting increased profits from Greenland’s hunting industry.
Secondly, it was important to represent the men as elite in order to express their status over the
general native population. Only if the native population recognized the ‘forstanderskab’ as
superior could they create a hierarchical control where the Greenlanders in the local council
functioned as a middle class between the rest of the native Greenlanders, the lower class, and the
Danes, the upper class. Incorporating natives into the local councils created an elite class of
Greenlanders that were allied with the Danish colonial administration. By incorporating native
Greenlanders into the colonial administration, it was easier for Denmark to control activities in
Greenland from overseas.
Figure 2 shows how Greenlandic occupations were divided into categories by the Danish
colonial administration. For example, Greenlanders without a kayak were categorized as either
(1) boys or (2) incompetent adults; Greenlanders were expected to have a kayak to hunt,
otherwise they were shamed. Further, fishing and wage labor was deemed ‘unnatural
occupations’ for Greenlanders. Rud (2014) highlights this point by quoting a principle of one of
the catechists colleges who is concerned that his student is not becoming a good seal hunter. The
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principle explains that his student has “become unused to, and unskilled in, the essential national
occupation [i.e. seal hunting], and has at the same time of course become accustomed to manners
and needs that make life as a Greenlander difficult if not impossible” (Janssen 1856, quoted by
Rud 2014).

Instruction of 1782
The first state law in Greenland was also introduced in 1782; this piece of legislation was known
as The Instruction of 1782. The full title of the legislation was “Instruction, to which the
tradesmen or those who are in charge of trading and/or the whaling stations in Greenland in

37

particular and all employees of the trading company in general will have to adhere”7. This
legislation describes how Europeans and Greenlanders should and shouldn’t interact. The census
material shows an increase in attention to the registration of individuals’ social and cultural
background. Relationships between Greenlanders and Europeans were carefully monitored,
registered and regulated. Romantic relationships between Greenlanders and Europeans were
considered dangerous, but also potentially useful in promoting the goals of the mission and the
trade department. Rudolph Lassen, who was a missionary who worked in the factory in Ilulissat,
writes that some mixed marriages produced children “of use to the Country and the Trade”
(1795, p. 288, quoted in Seiding, 2011, p. 57). Further, Lassen argues that intermarriage can be
used as a tool in the civilizing project, as intermarriage can help spread the Danish language and
cultural education. Children of European fathers and Greenlandic mothers, known as ‘mixtures’8,
played a crucial role in Denmark’s attempts to structure the behavior of the Greenlandic people;
they were treated as an elite class of Greenlanders that were allied with the colonial
administration. Men employed by the Royal Trading Department had to apply with the Inspector
for permission to marry and the marriages would only proceed if they were deemed acceptable.
Greenlanders were split into two classes based on race: ‘mixed’ Greenlanders (one European
parent and one Danish parent) and ‘pure’ Greenlanders, where mixed were of higher status than
pure Greenlanders. Danes and Greenlanders were categorized hierarchically to determine who
was allowed to marry whom. Superior Danish staff members were not allowed to marry Inuit
women, mixed or pure, and common staff members were only allowed to marry women of

7

In Danish: Instrux, hvorefter Kiøbmændene eller de som enten bestyre Handelen eller forestaae
Hvalfanger-Anlæggene i Grønland, i Særdeleshed, saavelsom og alle de der staae i Handelens Tieneste i
Almindelighed, sig for fremtiden have at rette og forholde.
8

My translation, also used in Rud (2014) and Seiding (2011)
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mixed descent, not pure or European women. Mixed Greenlandic men were allowed to marry
both mixed and pure Greenlandic women.

Grønlanderhjemmet (‘Civilizing’)
The idea that Denmark’s colonization of Greenland helped Greenlanders become more civilized
was present in Danish colonial policy. Grønlanderhjemmet, a boarding house in Copenhagen,
was an example of attempts to civilize Greenlanders. Grønlanderhjemmet resembled a
reformatory and was meant to civilize Greenlanders in a controlled setting. As explained in the
Royal Greenland Trading Department’s official documents “the Greenlanders should be
educated by local employers in the city and, as much as possible, become accustomed to moving
among strangers, but they should have a common homely refuge, where furthermore one can
keep them under appropriate control” (Anon,. 1879, quoted in Rud, 2014, p. 558, Rud’s
translation). However while Grønlanderhjemmet was meant to civilize the Greenlanders, the
colonial officials also did not want Greenlanders in the boarding house to become too
accustomed to the luxuries of life in Copenhagen; they wanted to create the correct mixture of
traditional Greenlandic and modern “civilized” cultural elements. To keep the residents of
Grønlanderhjemmet grounded, they made simple meals and kept artifacts from Greenland in the
house. Rud (2014) explains that the “boarding house provides an example of the social
engineering techniques by means of which colonial policies promoted a specific version of the
Greenlandic tradition” (p. 559).
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‘Protecting’ Greenlanders from Western Influence
Much of Denmark’s Greenland policy in the 1850s aimed to protect the Greenlandic society
from Western influences (Marquardt 1993, 1999; Thuesen 2007; Thisted 2002; Wilhjelm 1997;
Rud 2014). Trade, whaling and the daily administration of the Danish colonies were run by
private merchants from 1772 until 1774. In 1774 the Danish state took over and in 1776 the
Royal Greenland Trading Department, run by the Danish colonial administration, monopolized
trade. The Danish colonial administration justified the monopolization of Greenland by claiming
that Greenlanders are fragile and in need of their protection; they viewed the Greenlanders as
“children of nature” (Marquart, 1993) with “immature mental attitudes that had to be radically
changed” (Marquart, 1993, p. 12). The Instruction of 1782 restricted exposure to Western
influences, claiming that too much interaction with the Europeans leads to “laziness, neglect of
hunting, debauchery, depravity and too much disorder” (Instrux, 1782, p. 4). Thisteed notes that
developments in the colonial history of Denmark’s relation to Greenland have created a Danish
perception of “Greenlanders as a fragile people of nature” (2009, p. 107-9, my translation).
These policies, which claimed to be based on a need to protect Inuit culture, create a harmful
binary of Greenlandic identity where the ‘authentic’ Greenlandic identity is viewed as primitive
and in need of protection, whereas a modernized Greenlander is considered inauthentic.
Ole Marquardt, a historian who has worked as a professor at Ilismiatusarfik University
and Århus University, illustrates ways in which misguided conceptions of Greenlandic identity
and tradition led to lower employment and protectionism in Greenland. Marquardt examines the
trade policies put in place by the Danish colonial administration. Gad (2013) suggests the trade
monopoly imposed by the Danish colonial administration was driven by economic motivations,
rather than a desire to protect the Greenlandic society. He points out that when establishing the
Royal Greenland Trading Company Denmark took several measures to weed out competition,
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such as Dutch and Basque whalers and Norwegian hunters, to ensure Denmark had a monopoly
on Greenlandic resources. This implies that the protectionist policies put in place by the colonial
administration were not a thought-through consideration of how free trade might harm
Greenlandic society and identity, but rather a desire to monopolize Greenlandic resources.
Marquardt claims that many in the Danish colonial administration believed that
employment by the Royal Greenland Trade Department harmed Greenlandic identity. He claims
that many scholars viewed employment by the Royal Greenland Trade Department as part of the
westernization process in Greenland, founded on the belief that “the diffusion of wage labour
among the members of a society is seen as an important indication of the ‘westernization’ or
modernization of this society” (1996, p. 106). Finn Gad, a scholar of Greenlandic history, wrote
in his book History of Greenland that Greenlanders originally looked down upon male persons
who earned their livelihood as subordinate ‘servants’ (Greenlandic: kiffat) in someone else's
service (1968, p. 365). W. Graah, who claims to have been repeating the words of Hans Egede,
the missionary who colonized Greenland and director of the Royal Greenland Trade Department,
when he writes that: "the Greenlander lives in a perfect state of liberty and despises any fellowcountryman who makes himself a slave by entering into the service of the Europeans" (Graah
1828-31, p. 132). However, Ole Marquardt disputes the commonly held belief that the
Greenlandic people resisted employment by the Danish colonial administration. Marquardt
claims that according to his extensive data analysis “Indigenous Greenlanders took advantage of
the opportunities for gaining permanent full-time employment with the RGTD (Royal Greenland
Trading Department)“ (1996, p. 106).
Further, Marquardt looks at the ways in which religious boundaries were proliferated by
selective employment by the Royal Greenland Trade Department. Greenlanders were converted
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to the Christian faith by the Danish Royal Mission and the Hernhutians (those of Moravian
brethren). Marquardt discovers that only those affiliated with the Danish Royal Mission were
employed by the Royal Greenland Trade Department, whereas the Hernhutians were typically
seal hunters and fishermen. Marquardt writes that “the natives adhering to the Danish Mission
were occupationally diversified and westernized to a much higher degree” (p. 107). He
speculates that the Royal Greenland Trade Department did not employ as many of the
Hernhutians because they were seen as authentic Greenlanders who should not be westernized.
The underemployment of the Hernhutians also explains why the Hernhutians were hit harder
during the economic crisis in 1850-1880.
Marquardt (1999) discusses Greenland’s economic crisis from 1850-1880, otherwise
known as the great socio-economic crisis of Greenland. Authorities in the Danish Greenlandic
administration, such as H.J. Rink, claimed that the Greenlandic people were trading too much of
their necessary goods, such as blubber and skins, for luxury goods such as coffee and sugar.
Marquart explains that many in the Danish colonial administration believed the Greenlandic
people’s consumption of luxury goods caused the great socio-economic crisis of Greenland.
Further, he explains that the general perception of the historical event has not changed; he writes,
“the moral interpretation of the crisis made the hunters responsible for bringing about their own
misery by trading in ever rising proportions of their catch, thereby depleting themselves of the
blubber and skins necessary for e.g., boat construction and repair”.
Recognized author Mads Lidegaard, who published a series of books about Greenland,
confirms Marquardt’s suspicions about the continuing perception that the crisis originated with
the frivolous consumption of coffee by the Greenlandic people. In 1962 Lidegaard writes: “One
takes comfort in believing that the violent consumption of alcohol and other luxury goods will be
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but a transitional phenomenon and that it will regulate itself when the standard of living will
reach a level where one no longer needs to find comfort in a bottle or something similar.
Actually one used to say exactly the same a hundred years ago when the Greenlandic population
through abuse of coffee was heading for its own destruction. Admittedly, in the end things were
ameliorated - but the amelioration process lasted for two generations and not for just 5 to 10
years” (Lidegaard 1962, p. 314).
Using extensive data of coffee consumption and incomes in West Greenland in the
1800s Marquart argues that the Greenlandic people’s consumption of coffee should not have
been worrisome. Further, he finds, that while the crisis was much greater in Southern Greenland
than in Northern Greenland, the coffee consumption was much greater in Northern Greenland.
Instead Marquart identifies the disappearance of the net hunt in in the 1850s in the Hernhutian
congregations as a cause of the economic crisis. Marquardt counters the belief that the crisis
was caused by “immature behavior on the part of the Greenlandic population” (Marquardt, ,
implying that the following colonial policies that aimed to protect Greenland from outside
influences were unnecessary. Marquardt’s paper is significant as it refutes the commonly
believed notion that the economic crisis was caused by irresponsible consumption by
Greenlanders, which laid the groundwork for the Danish perception that Greenlanders need their
protection.

Long-term Effects on Greenlandic Identity
Rud (2014) argues that the way in which Danish colonial policies attempted to socially engineer
Greenlanders has created a harmful perception of Greenlandic identity that persists to this day.
Rud argues that understanding the motivations for these colonial-era policies is important as the
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policies continue to influence Danish understanding of Greenland today. He writes: “The
practice of contrasting the ‘victims of colonization’ Greenlanders of the west coast with
‘authentic and traditional’ Greenlanders from the east coast (later on also from Northern
Greenland) epitomizes the dominant representation of Greenlandic culture in the nineteenth
century and on into the twentieth” (p. 365). In fact, Rud explains that this binary is harmful to
Danes’ views of Greenlanders today. He writes: “The enduring image of Greenlanders as either
living in a static state of aboriginality or as marginalized losers in the modern world has had a
deep impact on the popular understanding of Greenlanders among Danes” (p 566). Ultimately
Rud advises “Even when Greenlandic identity is articulated with Inuit cultural traditions it is
important to allow this identity to be as flexible and dynamic as we allow western identities to
be” (2014, p. 269). Rud argues that it is important to reexamine Greenland’s colonial past in
order to understand the contemporary view of Greenland and how it originates with colonial
policies in order to create a dynamic view of Greenlandic identity; Greenlandic identity should
not be viewed as a binary where they are either in touch with nature, primitive and ‘real
Greenlandic’ or modernized, westernized and not ‘real Greenlandic’.
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Chapter 4: From Colony to Dependent
Greenland was officially decolonized in 1953, becoming an independent nation within the
Danish Realm. However, scholars and observers claim that this formal decolonization
paradoxically strengthened Denmark’s influence in Greenland; the 1950s and 1960s were known
as the period of modernization or ‘Danization’ (Grydehøj 2016). Much like Acemoglu et al.
(2001) show how extractive institutions set up by colonizers were harmful to the colony’s longterm development, I will argue that Denmark’s interventions in this period centered Greenland’s
institutional structure around extracting cod fish rather than promoting inclusive development. In
this chapter, I will explore how Denmark’s focus on extracting codfish from Greenland in the
1950s and 60s changed the institutional structure in Greenland. In Greenland, the focus on cod
fishing necessitated rapid urbanization and created disruptions in Greenland’s labor market and
an economy centered on producing primary goods. I explore ways in which Danish interventions
in the 1950s and 60s impacted Greenland’s economy, labor market and social well-being and
cohesion in the long term.

Historical Context: The End of Colonization and Beginning of Modernization
During World War II Denmark was invaded by Germany, leaving Greenland as an unoccupied
territory. During this period Greenlandic movements for self-determination strengthened and the
international community emphasized the need for worldwide decolonization. Although Denmark
and Greenland re-established their political ties after the war, these factors prompted Denmark to
change their relationship to Greenland. In 1953 Greenland was given home-rule, effectively
integrating Greenland into the Danish state and giving Greenland the same power as any other
Danish higher-level municipality (Danish:amt). However, these changes actually strengthened
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Denmark’s influence in Greenland in many ways (Grydehøj 2016). On the 29th of November,
1948, Grønlandskommissionen (the Greenland Commission) was appointed to make policy
recommendations to aid in a process of modernization. The Greenland Commission had a main
commission, with 16 members and nine sub-commissions with a total of 105 members. The
commission claimed to be promoting the goals of the Greenlandic people, yet only 12 out of the
105 members on the sub-commissions were Greenlandic. The first Commission report was
known as the G-50, while the second, published in 1964, was known as G-60.9

The Fishing Industry as an Extractive Institution
The Greenland Commission reports explain that modernization efforts in Greenland should “first
and foremost be centered around cod fishing” (Greenland Commission Report 1960, p. 12). By
1964 four filet factories are up and running each with capacity for around 40 000lbs; these
factories can handle around 200 tons of fish every day. By 1966 there were factories in the five
big cities Narsaq, Paamiut, Nuuk, Maniitsoq and Sisimiut. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001) show that when colonizers don’t settle in a colony, they will set up extractive institutions
focused on extracting resources from the colony, leading to less protection of property rights and
lower GDP per capita in the long-run. The goal of the Danish state in the 1950s and 60s was to

9

A note on using the Greenland Commission reports as sources: The two Greenland Commission reports are both
primary sources written primarily by the colonial power; although they are artifacts created during the time of study
and are thereby evidential in nature, their information is clearly biased towards the perspective of the Danish
Colonial Administration. Grydehøj (2016) explains that the decolonization of Greenland and modernization efforts
outline in the Commission reports were “planned and determined by the Danish government, with little input from
Greenlanders”. In my analysis I will use Ann Stoler (2009)’s methodological framework for approaching the 1950
and 1960 Greenland Commission reports. While one could argue that the documents’ skewed perspective make
them hard to use as a credible source, Stoler invites us to read along the archival grain; she prescribes reading
colonial archives as “condensed sites of epistemological and political anxiety rather than skewed and biased
sources” (p. 20). In this vein, I will be using the Commission reports to study the nature of the Danish colonial rule
over Greenland. I will not be viewing reports as sources of evidence about the state of Greenland at the time, but
rather to analyze what are the writers of the report are hiding and why. I will attempt to unpack why and how the
authors of the report are pushing Greenland’s economy towards industrial cod fishing.
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extract one particular resource: fish. For this reason they set up institutions in Greenland to make
it easier to extract fish from Greenland. Promoting industrial cod fishing changed Greenland’s
structure in several ways and the policies outlined in these reports dictated Denmark’s economic
development policy for many years to come. In this section, I will look at changes in Greenland’s
institutional structure prompted by the focus on extracting cod from Greenland in the 1950s and
60s. I will look at the introduction of free trade in Greenland, urbanization and its long-term
impacts, disruptions in the labor market, including an influx of imported Danish labor and
discrimination in the labor market and possible long-term effects of re-centering Greenland’s
economy on the production of primary goods.

Paternalistic or Economically Motivated?
Throughout this chapter I will be examining the Danish colonial administration’s paternalistic
rhetoric; are they using paternalistic language to disguise their real economic goals in promoting
industrial cod fishing in Greenland? The last director of the Greenland Commission claimed the
initiative aimed to ”to impart civilization and culture to the Greenlanders” (Oldendow, l952, p.
16-36). We see this view expressed time and time again in the policy prescriptions of the
Commission reports highlighted above. The Commission even describes the modernization
efforts as a strenuous task Denmark was doing for Greenland; “A series of new institutions have
been established in Greenland and exceedingly many difficult work tasks have been imposed on
the administration in Copenhagen” (Greenland Commission, 1960, p. 3). However, there is also
evidence that the Danish colonial administration is economically motivated. In the Commission
reports, we see evidence that the authors of the report have made in-depth considerations of the
potential economic gains of the fishing industry. We see this, for example, in the use of tables to
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show the revenue of fishing versus sealing (see for example table 15 in the 1960 Greenland
Commission report), which show that the profitability of the fishing industry was undoubtedly a
consideration. The Commission report even outlines models for how profitable different
industrial fishing plants are; “The economic opportunities that lie in such an operational form are
illustrated in a simplified model of the operation of a 40,000 lbs. filleting plant with associated
lines in Annex 12” (Greenland Commission, 1960, p. 3). Here we, again, see the commission
consciously pointing out the economic opportunities of promoting industrial fishing. But if the
Danish Colonial Administration was economically motivated, why not make that explicit?
Throughout history, we have seen many examples of colonial rulers imposing force and violence
in their colonies to reap economic gains. When viewing the Commission reports in their
historical context of the worldwide decolonization movement, the reports’ choice to disguise
their economic motivations make a lot more sense.

Decolonization in the 20th Century
In the context of the global decolonization movement in the 20th century, it would have been
especially important for the Danish colonial administration to hide any exploitative motivations.
In fact, Thorsten Borring Olesen, a scholar of Greenland’s postcolonial politics, claims that
Denmark only formally decolonized Greenland to adhere to Chapter XI of the UN Charter.
Chapter XI of the UN charter deals with "territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government” claiming that colonizers must “ensure the well-being of the
inhabitants of these territories”. The nature of Olesen’s argument is not isolated to Greenland; a
similar argument is presented in Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson’s discussion of Europe’s
decolonization of Africa. Hansen and Jonsson claim that the way in which Europe decolonized
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Africa in fact “secured a continuation for colonialism and at the same time went beyond it”
(2014, p.254). Hansen and Jonsson not only claim that the decolonization movement prompted
deficient changes, but that the changes initiated in fact worsened the situation in the long term. In
the same vein, scholar of the Arctic region, Naja Dyrendom Graugaard (2009), writes that
“modernization made Greenland economically more dependent on Denmark than ever before”
(p. 14).

Introduction of Free Trade
Danish officials that lived in Greenland and some Greenlanders had long criticized the failure to
abolish the trade monopoly (Gad 2014). They wanted a new development with access to private
Danish business in Greenland, and this pressure coupled with the unresolved question of the
continued US bases in Greenland from November 1947, the new Social-Democratic government
in favor of radical reforms. In 1948, Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft agreed to abolish the
monopoly, opening up Greenland to free trade.
While the Danish State would argue that free trade was introduced to comply with the
wishes of the indigenous, many scholars argue that they opened up Greenland’s markets to
foreign investment and international trade to support the extraction of codfish. Although it is true
that some Greenlanders wanted to see the abolishment of the trade monopoly, this had been an
expressed concern for a long time. The 1950 Commission report, which proposes the
introduction of free trade, also defends the Danish colonial administration’s previous
monopolization of trade. They write: “The monopoly sought to prevent the exploitation of
Greenlanders by private individuals and to protect the population against the world-wide
fluctuating prices on the Greenlandic export products that originally consisted mainly of
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sealskin, fox skins and polar bear skins and whale and seal oil” (Greenland Commission, 1960,
p. 117). This statement seems to imply that the price of cod fluctuates much less than that of
sealskin, fox skins and polar skin and whale and seal oil, yet the report provides no evidence to
back up this claim. Further, theories about the economic motivations for colonialism outlined in
chapter 1 views colonialism as a stage of capitalism that is prompted by the necessity for
colonizers to find new markets to invest their capital. Following this theory, Denmark’s trade
monopoly was most likely motivated by a desire for Denmark to find new markets to invest their
capital in. The introduction of free trade seems to be a continuation of a similar motivation, but
in a new context. With the transition to cod fishing, there are more revenue opportunities if they
open up Greenland to foreign capital and foreign markets. The Commission does not explicitly
recognize the economic necessity of this transition for the importation of foreign capital and the
ultimate success of the cod fishing industry. However, they focus on the potential positive
benefits of this transition for Greenland. They write: “The main goal we are striving toward in
opening up Greenland to Danish private capital is not to create new business opportunities for
Danish capital, but to develop a business sector operated by Greenlanders and for the benefit of
Greenlandic society” (Greenland Commission, 1950, p.30). We see the self-awareness of the
Commission presented in this quote. It almost seems like the Commission is attempting to
counteract this idea, claiming specifically that they are not opening up Greenland to ‘create new
business opportunities for Danish capital’. In the same quote we see the Danish administration
express ‘moral’ reasons for wanting to raise living standards in Greenland by promoting the cod
fishing industry; the Commission claims they wish to “develop a business sector operated by
Greenlanders and for the benefit of Greenlandic society” (1960, pp30). These notions of the
civilizing mission become increasingly clear as the Commission continues to explain how
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bringing in Danish companies will benefit Greenlanders. The Commission explains that their
“goal is to establish private and independent Danish and Faeroe businesses in Greenland, such
that they will be able to teach Greenlanders modern ways of conducting business, and thereby
contribute to the advancement of business development in Greenland” (Greenland Commission,
1950, Vol. 5, p. 30). Here (and throughout the report) the Commission expresses that the
Greenlandic people need their help. Again we see both economic motivations and paternalism
invoked in the promotion of the cod fishing industry. In this case economic motivations and
paternalism are virtually inseparable as both lead to the same action: promoting the cod fishing
industry. This is economically motivated because it may increase revenues to Denmark and
‘morally’ motivated as the commission reports argue that they want to promote cod fishing to
improve Greenland’s economy to help the Greenlanders.

Urbanization
The planned introduction of industrial cod fishing prompted mass urbanization in Greenland. In
order to promote industrial cod fishing, they needed the Greenlandic people to concentrate in
cities rather than sprawl across Greenland as they did before. When seal hunting was the main
occupation in Greenland, it made sense for Greenlandic population to sprawl. If the population
were concentrated in one city, seals would migrate away from this densely populated area.
However, for industrial fishing, the population must be concentrated in cities to benefit from
increased economies of scale. Processing cod fish takes place in industrial plants and is labor
intensive. Urbanization lowers transportation costs for inputs (mainly labor) and increase the
possibility for knowledge spillovers by allowing workers who live close together to learn from
each other (O’Sullivan, 2007). The commission is clearly aware of this, explaining that labor will
be more accessible if the population concentrates in cities, rather than sprawling across rural
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Greenland. They write: “more intensive exploitation of labor is easier to accomplish in larger
cities than in the current with around 500-4000 residents” (Greenland Commission, 1960, p. 27).
The reports show that Denmark does not invest in small settlements outside of the cities. The
Commission explains that “Gathering the population in the so-called open-water area will yield
the greatest economic progress” (Greenland Commission, 1960, p. 103). On Figure 3 we can see
the long-term urbanization initiated after the 1950 and 1960 Greenland Commission reports. On
Figure 3 urban population is expressed as a percentage of the total population. Interestingly, the
Commission refers to this process of urbanization as “localization”. Perhaps this choice of words
is meant to make the process sound like it’s focused on local values.

Source: The World Bank

While urbanization is often viewed a normative goal in development economics (Roland, 2016,
p.113-135), the Greenland case suggests that urbanization can have negative effects on social
well-being and cohesion.
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Long-term Effects on Social Well-Being and Cohesion
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Since the 1950s, the rapid modernization of Greenland has been accompanied by increased
suicide rates, drinking problems and violence. On figures 4 and 5 we see that Greenland’s
suicide rate increases sharply from 1952 until the early 1980s, whereafter it stays fairly high. On
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figure 5 we can see that the rise in Greenland’s suicide rates is not mirrored in Denmark, or
indeed any of the Scandinavian countries. Scholars such as Thorslund (1990), Leineweber (2000)
and Bjerregaard and Lynge (2006) have documented a correlation between the modernization of
Greenland in the 1950s and 60 and a subsequent rise in suicide rates. Most notably Bjerregaard
and Lynge (2006) examine regional differences within Greenland, showing that suicide rates rise
first in parts where modernization came first. They argue that the increase in suicide rates was
caused by the shift from relatively isolated, self-reliant communities based on subsistence
hunting and fishing to wage labor in cities.
The idea that modernization may cause a rise in suicide rates comes from sociologist
Emilie Durkheim (1897)’s book Le Suicide. Durkheim claims that suicide rates change “abruptly
and completely whenever there is an abrupt change in social environment” (1897, p. 138). While
suicide is an individual decision, Durkheim argues that the decision to commit suicide is affected
by social integration and regulation in society; thus suicide rates increase during periods of rapid
change when society no longer has common rules and values.
While it is “not apparent from the epidemiological data which specific components of the
modernization process are the most influential” (Bjerregaard and Lynge, 2006, p. 216), there is a
consensus among scholars that high suicide rates in Greenland have been connected to Danish
interventions in Greenland in the 1950s and 60s. Bjerregaard and Lynge speculate that suicide
can be seen as an act of resistance or defiance. Using survey data, Bjerregaard and Lynge find
that alcohol problems in the home and being the victim of sexual violence as a child, both
increase the frequency of reported suicidal thoughts. “Among those who reported frequent
alcohol problems and also had been sexually violated, 82% had harbored suicidal thoughts
compared with 10% among those who had not been exposed to either” (p. 212). This indicates
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that the rise in suicide rates is intertwined with different problems of social cohesion and wellbeing, stemming from a disruption in the social structure. We see a similar trend in alcohol
consumption on figure 6; alcohol consumption rises sharply in 1960, plateauing in the early 80s
and decreasing in the late 80s, early 90s. Leineweber (2001) draws information on the
occupation of those committing suicide. He finds that while unemployed people commit suicide
most, fishermen and hunters commit suicide almost as frequently. Not surprisingly low
skilled/blue collar workers commit suicide more frequently than high skilled/white collar
workers.
Similar arguments about a connection between rapid modernization and suicide
epidemics have been documented in different post-colonial contexts; Boothroyd, Kirmayer,
Spreng et al. (2001) look at this question among the Inuit of northern Québec, Hunter & Harvey
(2002) among the indigenous in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States,
Kirmayer (1994) among the Canadian aborigines, Macpherson and Macpherson (1987) in
Western Samoa and Rubenstein (1983; 1992) in Micronesia.
In other work I test the generalizability of the connection between urbanization and
suicide rates seen in Greenland. I use panel data from 202 countries from 1990-2016 to test
whether there is a correlation between urbanization rates and suicide rates. Using a fixed effects
model I find a correlation between urbanization and increases in suicide rates in countries that
were once colonized. In countries that were never colonized the opposite correlation exists (see
results in appendix 1). This says something about the post-colonial context. In a post-colonial
context urbanization was often orchestrated by the colonial or former colonial state, so it was
externally forced structural change rather than perhaps a structural change planned
democratically by the people indigenous to the country in question. When urbanization is
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prompted externally, it is more likely to create social disruption resulting in anomic suicides.
While urbanization is typically viewed as progress, an extreme interpretation of this result could
be that colonization creates the mirror image of progress. In the context of Greenland’s postcolonial period urbanization seems to have been promoted by the Danish state in order to support
the fishing industry. This result suggests that although Denmark was attempting to promote the
fishing industry and generate higher living standards in Greenland, it resulted in social disruption
seen in increasing suicide rates. In this perhaps good-intentioned intervention we see once again
the paradox highlighted in Freuchen’s quote “by gifts you make slaves” (1961, p. 154). To
generalize this correlation, we must look more closely at how and why urbanization occurred in
other former colonies.

Disruptions in the Labor Market
Imported Danish Labor
The Commission’s emphasis on promoting industrial cod fishing also introduced new dynamics
to the labor market in Greenland, namely increased importation of Danish labor. During the
modernization period, the Danish share of the total working-age population (15-64 years old) in
Greenland rose from 5.8 percent in 1950 to 17.4 percent by 1965, to more than 26 percent by the
end of the Danish administration. The Commission describes how labor must be imported from
Denmark to promote the industrial fishing industry: “In order to complete a construction and
infrastructure development of the size outlined in the recommendations, it will be necessary to
import manpower from Denmark” (Greenland Commission, 1950, Vol 1, p. 52). The
Commission claims “there is not enough educated manpower available in Greenland.
Furthermore, it would seem irresponsible to employ Greenlandic manpower in construction that
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is of a temporary nature. This would only limit the opportunities for Greenlanders to engage in,
and improve upon the traditional Greenlandic occupations, which are going to provide the
economic foundation of the society” (Greenland Commission, 1950, Vol 1, p. 52). Again we see
the Danish administration invoking the morality the civilizing mission in their claim that
Denmark must bring in labor because it might be harmful to employ Greenlanders. The report
does not recognize ways in which the Danish labor market benefits from opening up new
employment opportunities for Danish workers. Further, although the reports use extensive data
on the profitability of the fishing industry, they do not report any numbers to support their claim
that there isn’t enough educated manpower in Greenland.

Discrimination in the Labor Market
With the prescription for increased importation of Danish labor, the Commission also created
privileges for the imported labor. The 1960s Commission outlines a discriminatory wage
differential policy, which was later passed in the Greenland Civil Servants Act. This policy,
known as the ‘birthplace-criterion’, states that civil servants born in Greenland should receive
85% of the salary received by those born in Denmark. The policy was in place until 1991. The
introduction of the Birthplace-Criterion shows two things. It contradicts the claim that the
Commission was acting on behalf of the Greenlandic people. It also reveals the Commission’s
self-consciousness; the Commission expresses that they knew that the global community would
not look favorably on a discriminatory wage policy and thus attempt to distract from the
discriminatory nature of this policy. For example, on page 155, where the Greenland
Commission outlines the Birthplace-Criterion, they write: “Of the disadvantages (of the
Birthplace-Criterion), the worst thing is that it can be interpreted as racial discrimination”
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(Greenland Commission report, 1960, 155). They spend a few pages defining the prescription,
claiming that it is not racially discriminatory because it is based on where the person is born and
not their racial makeup.

Worsening Terms of Trade?
Today Greenland’s economy is small, open and highly dependent upon fisheries and an annual
block grant from Denmark. In figure 8 we see that Greenland almost exclusively exported fish in
2016. Viewed in light of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (1950), we see why the promotion of
cod fishing in Greenland might have worsened Greenland’s terms of trade, making Greenland
more economically dependent on Denmark and other core countries.
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis describes a dialectical relationship between countries
which export primary goods, ‘periphery’ countries, and countries which export manufactured
goods, ‘core’ countries. Primary goods are raw, unprocessed goods, whereas manufactured
goods are primary goods that have value added through a manufacturing process. Greenland’s
economy is mainly a primary sector economy which focuses on industries such as fishing and
mining, whereas Denmark’s exports are mainly manufactured goods, such as computers, phones
and packaged medicaments.10 The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis claims that, over time, the terms
of trade worsen for periphery countries, while improving the terms of trade for core countries.
Terms of trade is defined as the ratio of an index of export prices by an index of import prices.
The common explanation for the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis involves the differences in income
elasticity of demand for primary goods and manufactured goods. When a periphery country
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The line between primary goods and manufactured goods is not clear cut; the fishing industry, for example, does
involve some processing of the fish.
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trades their primary good for a core country’s manufactured good, the economy rises. When real
disposable incomes rise, the demand for both the primary good and the manufactured good rises.
However, the income elasticity of demand for primary goods is typically lower than the income
elasticity of demand for manufactured goods. This is because primary goods are often necessity
goods, whereas manufactured goods are often luxury goods. People generally consume the same
amount of fish regardless of a rise in their income, whereas people are likely to only buy a fancy
computer if their income rises. This means that although the rise in disposable incomes created
by the trade causes the demand of both goods to rise, the demand for manufactured goods rises
more than the demand for primary goods and thereby the price of manufactured goods will rise
more than the price for primary goods. Because demand for primary goods rises less than the
demand for manufactured goods the trade causes the price of primary goods to fall relative to the
price of the manufactured good, worsening the terms of trade for periphery countries. Over time,
periphery countries, such as Greenland must export more of their primary products (fish) to
import the same amount of manufactured goods, whereas core countries have to export less
manufactured goods to import the same amount of primary goods.
Further it is not easy for periphery countries to shift to the production of manufactured
goods and they thereby become dependent on importing manufactured goods from core
countries. As the trade between periphery and core countries continues, the terms of trade gets
worse and worse for periphery countries. Some argue that this can cause debt growth and
decreases in wealth of periphery countries, creating a vicious cycle where it becomes harder and
harder for periphery countries to move from producing primary goods to producing
manufactured goods. The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis signifies a way in which existing global
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inequality is proliferated by trade within the market mechanism and suggests that centering
Greenland’s economy on fish worsens their terms of trade in the long-term.

Environmental Consequences
Further, the promotion of industrial cod fishing in the 1950s and 60s may have bad long-term
effects on the environment. As Kurlansky (1998) describes, industrial fishing techniques have
led to overfishing with dire ecological and socioeconomic consequences. However, it is not only
the environmental consequences of overfishing industrial fishing brought to Greenland.
Institutional economists who oppose the overemphasis on the free market might suggest that the
introduction of free trade hindered Greenland’s ability to deal with community concerns in the
long-term. This argument claims that since the free market organizes production and
consumption based on individual choices, the free market is less apt at addressing large scale
environmental concerns in the future. In imposing their economic system, they are imposing a
way of organizing society that makes Greenland unable to make decisions that take community
concerns into consideration in the long term. Environmental issues are a big concern in
Greenland today. As Greenland’s ice caps melt, their natural resources and minerals become
more accessible. While Greenland hopes revenues from these resources and minerals will aid
their desire for economic self-reliance, the mining of the resources raises environmental concerns
surrounding the exploitation of natural resources.
In this chapter, I have examined possible long-term effects of Danish interventions in
Greenland in the 1950s and 60s. Denmark’s modernization of Greenland has been statistically
linked to falls in measures of social cohesion and well-being. Further, I explored disruptions in
the labor market and possible long-term effects of the focus on cod fishing, such as unequal
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terms of trade and an inability to deal with environmental concerns. Throughout this chapter, I
have examined the paternalistic rhetoric of the 1950s and 1960s Commission reports. Denmark’s
interventions in the post-colonial period seem to be equally contradictory as colonial policies in
the previous period, indicating evidence of both economic and ‘moral’ motivations.
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Chapter 5: Contemporary Struggles for Sovereignty
After Greenland’s official decolonization, there have been many efforts to achieve greater
autonomy from Denmark. Greenland acquired Home-Rule in 1979 and Self-Government in
2009, yet there is a continuing discussion in Greenland on how to achieve greater autonomy from
Denmark. Although Greenland has not been a formal colony for more than 60 years, they are still
economically dependent on Denmark.

Snapshot of Greenland’s Economy
Today Greenland has a fairly high standard of living. Their economy is small, open and highly
dependent upon fisheries and an annual block grant from Denmark.
Measures of Development
As seen on figure 7 Greenland has a high gross domestic product per capita. We can also see that
their GDP per capita follows Denmark’s periods of growth and recession fairly closely, but on a
lower level. In 2015 the block grant of 3.719 billion krones from Denmark, which was around
30% of their GDP that year.
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Figure 7: GDP per capita (Current US$)

Source: World Bank

Greenland’s Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.86911 in 2008. The Human Development
Index measures development beyond simply GDP per capita. HDI also looks at health outcomes,
measured by life expectancy, and educational outcomes, measured by mean years of schooling.
For comparison, Greenland’s HDI is around the same level as that of Greece (0.869), Brunei
(0.865) and the Czech Republic (0.878), while Denmark’s HDI was 0.91 (in 2010). The life
expectancy in Greenland was 71.83 years in 2013, Denmark's was 80.3.

Important Industries
Fishing is still the most important industry in Greenland. Since the 1960s Greenland’s cod stock
has dwindled due to overfishing and climatic changes. Now Greenland fishes mainly prawns and
11

This was not calculated by the UNDP.
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halibut and recently mackerel (Andersen, 2015). However, economist Torben Andersen claims
that the fishing industry cannot provide a much larger economic base than it currently is. He
explains: ”There is definitely scope for improvements, and productivity can be increased, but it is
not realistic that it can reach a scale to push the economy towards self-sustainability” (2015, p.
25). Overall catch levels cannot be increased and may have to be decreased for some fish
species.
Other important industries include tourism, energy and minerals and hunting and
agriculture. The tourism industry has been rising in the past two decades; the number of tourists
visiting Greenland has increased from about 3,500 annually in the 1990s to about 35,000
annually today (Naalakkersuisut, 2017). However, tourism is a difficult industry to sustain as
Greenland’s harsh climate creates high transportation costs and only appeals to certain tourists.
Oil, gold, rubies, diamonds, coppers, olivine, marble and about 75 new mineral species have
been found in Greenland. Greenland hopes revenues from these resources and minerals will aid
their quest for economic self-reliance. However, the mining of the resources raises
environmental concerns. The hunting industry is small today, with about 10% of the workforce
directly or indirectly involved (Naalakkersuisut, 2017).

Trade
Greenland trades with EU countries, primarily Denmark. In 2016 87% of their exports went to
Denmark and 79% of their imports came from Denmark. In 2016 Greenland imported $622M
and exported $519M, resulting in a negative trade balance of $103M. Greenland consistently has
a trade deficit (The Observatory of Economic Complexity).
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Figure 8: Exports in 2016

Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity

As seen above Greenland primarily exported fish products in 2016. They exported frozen
shrimp, prawn, halibut, cod and mackerel.

Figure 9: Imports in 2016

Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity

Remnants of the Royal Greenland Trading Department
The Royal Greenland Trading Company was taken over by the Greenlandic Home Rule
government in 1986 and continued under the name Kalaallit Niuerfiat (KNI). In 1992 KNI was
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split up into different companies including a government-owned fishing company called Royal
Greenland Ltd. and a shipping company called Royal Arctic Line. Royal Greenland is one of the
two biggest fishing companies in Greenland today (Naalakkersuisut).

Labor Market
As seen in figure 10, unemployment in Greenland has been fluctuating around 10% since the
1990s. It is consistently higher than unemployment in the rest of the world and in Denmark.
Unemployment does not seem to follow Denmark’s trends as we saw with GDP.
Figure 10: Unemployment

Source: World Bank

Because we don’t have unemployment data from before the 1990s, it is unclear exactly how this
relatively high level of unemployment relates to the importation of Danish labor in the 1950s and
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60s discussed in chapter 4. However, there continues to be to a high level of labor imported from
abroad despite high unemployment. Mia Bennett points out the irony of high unemployment and
the continued importation of foreign labor in her article on the importation of Chinese labor to
work in fish-processing factories. Bennett writes: “The lack of a substantial labor force is one
reason why Royal Greenland has had to look all the way to China for workers. At the same time,
Greenland has an unemployment rate that tends to hover around 10 percent“ (2017). Looking at
comments on another news story Bennett seems to think this may have something to do with the
perception of Greenlandic workers being less suited for wage labor. She writes “One commenter
on Sermitsiaq (another Greenlandic newspaper)’s story on the topic hailing from Denmark
asked, ‘I can’t understand why one has to get workers all the way from China when the
unemployment rate is so high in the country.’ Another commenter responded, ‘It’s because
people magically get sick after payday,’ referencing the supposed unreliability of some
Greenlandic workers” (Bennett, 2017). Bennett also suggests that Greenlandic workers might
need flexible schedules to balance subsistence hunting and fishing with a wage labor job.
Bennett (2017) explains that although hunting is not a major industry in Greenland, a study done
by the University of Alaska found that 43% of the people survey had hunted sea mammals in the
last 12 months, 69% had fished and 71% had picked berries.
From the period 2008-2015 the labor force was comprised of approximately 87%
Greenlandic-born workers and 13% was foreign-born workers (Statistics Greenland). For
comparison, in 2015 about 9% (Danmarks Statistik, 2015, p. 59) of Denmark’s the labor force
was foreign-born and about 16.7% of the labor force was foreign-born in the United States of
America (Bureau of Labor Statistics). For this period the average monthly wage 12 of foreign-

12

From their “main occupation”
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born workers was 41,774.875kr, while the average monthly wage of Greenlandic-born workers
was 21,479.125 (Statistics Greenland, my calculations).

Economic Independence
To achieve complete sovereignty, Greenland must attain economic independence from Denmark.
Their main prospects for increased revenues are the block grant and revenues from minerals and
other non-renewable resources being discovered. However, these different revenue streams raise
different problems.

Block Grant
"Up here we say that by gifts one makes slaves and by whips one makes dogs"
(quoted in Graeber, 2011, p. 79, originally from Peter Freuchen’s Book of the Eskimo)

Greenland receives an annual block grant from Denmark which accounts for approximately 50%
of Greenland’s annual state budget and the Danish state pays for Greenland’s judiciary system
and defense (Statsministeriet, 2007; Kleist, 2010). In 2016 the block grant to Greenland was
3.682 billion kroner ($614 million using 2017 exchange rate).13 Both the Danish and Greenlandic
governments express wishes to end the block grant. Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke
Rasmussen has repeatedly stated that the block grant from Denmark must stop if Greenland is to
become independent.14 The Greenlandic government views economic self-sufficiency as key in
their process to complete self-determination.
Danish scholar of Greenland, Adam Grydehøj, investigates the effect of the block grant
on Greenlandic identity. Grydehøj (2016) claims that the block grant supports the view that

13
14

The amount given fluctuates each year as it is adjusted for inflation.
In this quote independence for Lars Løkke meant Greenland establishing their own constitution
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Denmark needs to nurture the Greenlandic society. He explains that the block grant is viewed as
foreign aid and, by collecting quotes from online comment threads to Danish newspaper articles,
Grydehøj concludes that “there is a Danish public perception that Greenlanders are ungrateful
(utaknemlige)” (2016). Essentially, Grydehøj is arguing that the block grant creates the
perception that Greenland is indebted to Denmark.
In David Graeber’s book Debt - the first 5,000 years Graeber claims that debt transforms
a previously equal relationship into a hierarchical relationship. For Graeber (2006), there are
three moral principles on which economic relationships can be founded: exchange, communism
and hierarchy. Exchange can only exist between two equal parties and is based on the logic of
reciprocity; in exchange when you give something to someone you expect to receive something
of equal value back.15 Hierarchy, however, implies a formal inequality. For Graeber, a debt
moves a transaction from an equal exchange relationship to a hierarchical relationship between
the creditor and the debtor. Graeber uses this idea to condemn IMF loans, claiming that these
loans are a simply a way of increasing a perception of hierarchical relationship between nations.
Similar ideas about the social effects of large global money transfers have been expressed about
foreign aid being created as a way to exert political power over developing nations (e.g. Escobar,
1995).
Although Greenland’s block grant is not expected to be paid back, many of Graeber’s
arguments about the perception of hierarchy brought about by the quantifiable transfer of money
are applicable to Greenland’s block grant. David Graeber also uses the Peter Freuchen quote I
used in my title. Graeber commends the Inuit for his refusal to calculate debts, by calculating
debts we are essentially “reducing each other to slaves”(79).
15

Everyday communism exists in situations where there is no need for reciprocity, it occurs "from each
according to their abilities, to each according to their needs"(Graeber, 2006, p. 95).
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Graeber discusses how hierarchy can affect the debtor’s identity; “the logic of identity is,
always and everywhere, entangled in the logic of hierarchy” (111). And later Graeber
specifically discusses the moral implications of not being able to restore equal relations: “If the
debtor cannot do what it takes to restore herself to equality, there is obviously something wrong
with her; it must be her fault” (121). Following this idea that an unpaid debt creates an unequal
relationship, the block grant Denmark gives to Greenland in some sense increases perceptions of
inequality between Greenland and Denmark, rather than helping Greenland achieve full
sovereignty as it is supposed to.
Further, once an unequal relationship is established between the debtor and the creditor,
the debtor might perform services for the creditor, but the debtor cannot expect anything in
return. Graeber writes “If you bring your creditor tomatoes from the garden, it never occurs to
you that he would give something back. He might expect you to do it again, though. But always
there is the assumption that the situation is somewhat unnatural, because the debt really ought to
be paid”(121). Grydehøj has a similar argument in the case of Greenland’s block grant, arguing
that has a that the block grant is beneficial to Denmark in many ways that are not acknowledged.
Grydehøj argues that the block grant should be viewed as an investment rather than a gift or form
of aid. He points out that nearly all of Greenland’s imported goods are imported from Danish
businesses. Therefore, the block grant increases demand for Danish goods, making the block
grant a beneficial investment for Denmark, as it is multiplied back into the Danish economy.
Further, Grydehøj argues that many Danish workers go to Greenland to work for short periods of
time and then return to Denmark with their accumulated wages. This causes their wages from
Greenland to be reinvested in the Danish economy, rather than the Greenlandic economy.
Grydehøj also argues that Denmark gains international power from its relationship to Greenland.
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As the polar ice caps melting is making natural resources and minerals more accessible,
Greenland is receiving more international attention. Further, Greenland has been of considerable
geopolitical and military interest internationally, and the United States has a significant military
radar situated in the North of Greenland. Grydehøj quotes former Foreign Minister of Denmark
Martin Lidegaard who says, “We quite simply make a greater impact in Beijing and Washington
and Berlin because we're associated with Greenland. It's among the elements that make
Denmark's foreign policy unique” (p. 108).
Grydehøj (2016) discusses how Greenlandic identity has been impacted by their colonial
history; he writes: “Greenland’s colonial experience has trapped it in a Denmark-oriented
conceptualisation of Greenlandic identity, which prevents the pursuit of potential political and
economic futures, for example gaining economic benefits through the provision of strategic
services to a patron state”. He claims that there is a binary conception of Greenlandic versus
Danish identity and that Greenlandic identity has come “to be defined in opposition to perceived
Danish values”. Grydehøj debates Greenland’s most promising path toward complete
sovereignty, both in terms of economic self-sufficiency and being able to configure a
Greenlandic identity independent of Denmark. He briefly discusses the excitement of many
created by the prospects of revenues from the new resources being discovered on Greenland.
However, drawing from experiences of other subnational island jurisdictions and writing by
Overton and Murray (2014), Grydehøj argues that the block grant provides better prospects for
Greenland’s economic independence; the block grant is a more long-term, sustainable revenue
stream than revenue from natural resources. Grydehøj argues that the perception of the block
grant must change from being regarded as charity to being viewed as a “payment for strategic
services”, for Greenland to be able to fully utilize the grant to achieve economic self-sufficiency.
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Resource Curse
Greenland’s desire for self-reliance is becoming more globally debated as the polar ice caps
melting is making natural resources and minerals more accessible in Greenland. Economists such
as Torben Andersen (2015) identify natural resources as Greenland’s most promising economic
prospect and Naalakkersuisut, the Greenlandic government, write: “a handful of promising
mining prospects are prepared, set to open during the next five years, making Greenland one of
the most interesting mining nations in the years to come“. While Greenland hopes revenues from
these resources and minerals will help them achieve economic self-reliance, the exploitation of
natural resources raises many concerns. Stevens and Dietsche (2008), for example, identify
Greenland as a country “at risk of ‘contracting’ the resource curse” (58).
Natural resources contribute to the economy in several unique ways that raise potential
problems. Natural resources generate temporary windfalls. They are non-renewable, meaning
that they have a fixed supply that is eventually depleted. They don’t reward productivity,
generating rents rather than wages/profits. They are a point-source good, which concentrates
economic activity to one area. And, finally, their supply is unpredictable. Sachs and Warner
(1995) are the first to document the existence of the resource curse; they show that there is a
robust negative relationship between a country’s share of primary exports and its subsequent
economic growth. There are several possible explanations for this correlation. One explanation
for this correlation is an idea known as the ‘Dutch Disease’, which claims that non-renewable
resources generate a large influx of money, the government spends money on non-traded goods,
labor and capital shift to the resource sector and other sectors don’t develop. Other scholars
suggest that natural resources have a bad effect on institutions. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian
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(2003) argue that the negative correlation identified by Sachs and Warner is created by natural
resources encouraging institutional decay. It is argued that the discovery of non-renewable
resources often create higher levels of corruption and rent-seeking behavior, incentivizing
government officials to create institutions which support unequal distributions of wealth.
Because non-renewable resources generate rents, government officials are incentivized to create
institutions that help them concentrate the wealth and keep the rents without making productive
changes in the country’s economic base. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian’s theory could suggest
that the increasing focus on the exploitation of Greenland’s natural resources might incentivize
institutional decay and more corruption in government. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006),
however, claim that institutional difference cause the divergent paths. If the country has good
institutions when they find the resources, resources can be good for growth. However, if the
country has bad institutions when they find the resources, the resources will encourage
corruption and will be bad for long-term growth. While most resource abundant countries have
been subject to the resource curse, countries with good institutions, like Norway, Botswana,
Canada and Australia, have used their resources to generate long-term growth. This theory
suggests that there are ways in which Greenland can avoid the resource curse. In 2014 a joint
committee between members of Ilisimatusarfik (the University of Greenland) and the University
of Copenhagen was set up to address Greenland’s resource potential. The committee suggested
establishing a wealth fund to stabilize the economy and avoid the problem of unpredictable
windfall revenues. They also argue that the block grant from Denmark could act as a stabilizer
for Greenland’s economy, which could potentially reduce overheating in times of large naturalresource revenue as well as compensate for periods of decline in this type of revenue. However,
incorporating the block grant into Greenland’s plans to exploit their resources seems like a step
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back towards increasing dependence rather than a step towards complete sovereignty. Finally,
the committee suggests addressing corruption by introducing a policy where individuals cannot
take a political post after having a seat on the board of a mining company and calls for greater
transparency surrounding the mining process generally.
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Concluding Remarks
“A shift in language (and also in thought) occurred after World War II. Verbiage about racial
superiority, the tutelage of backward peoples, and people not ready to rule themselves went into
the wastebasket. Self-rule and decolonization became universal principles. The West exchanged
the old racist coinage for a new currency. “Uncivilized” became “underdeveloped.” “Savage
peoples” became the “third world.” There was a genuine change of heart away from racism and
toward respect for equality, but a paternalistic and coercive strain survived”
(Easterly, 2006, p.28)
Throughout Greenland’s colonial and post-colonial history we see a tension in Danish policies
between rhetorics to disguise economic motivations and attempts to intervene “for the benefit of
Greenlandic society” (Greenland Commission Report, 1960, p. 30). In this project, I argue that it
is important to take seriously the ways in which Denmark genuinely thought they were helping
Greenland. As Conklin (1998) writes: “To capture the full complexity of not just the FrenchWest African colonial encounter but the myriad other democratic imperialisms during this
period, all the contingent and contradictory registers of liberal discourse must now be recovered
and analyzed” (p. 441). In chapter 3 I demonstrated how Danish colonial policies, on the one
hand, sought to civilize and modernize Greenlandic society and, on the other hand, attempted to
maintain traditional hunting practices for economic gain. These complex and sometimes
contradictory social engineering techniques of governance have been linked to long-term
problems of Greenlandic identity. In chapter 4 I analyze Denmark’s modernization plans, as read
in the Greenland Commission reports. I provide suggestive evidence that Denmark’s
modernization of Greenland was linked to rises in measures of social disruption, disruptions in
the labor market and perhaps even worsening terms of trade. Although Denmark claimed to have
been attempting to improve Greenland’s economy to raise living standards and “benefit

76

Greenlandic society” (Greenland Commission, 1960, p.30), this modernization period seems to
have had several bad effects. This shows that even when a colonial power is trying to help the
indigenous, paternalistic interventions can have complex effects; paternalistic interventions
prevented Greenland’s economy from developing in an autonomous way.
This critique of Denmark’s attempts to ‘help’ Greenland is not isolated to the case of
Greenland, nor is it just a historical question; we are still grappling with the issue of how to help
effectively. As Easterly’s quote alludes to, paternalistic policies are not just a thing of the past. In
his critique of development economics, The White Man’s Burden, William Easterly (2006) ties
the beginning of foreign aid to colonialism, arguing that foreign aid programs hold back local
attempts to increase living standards using local institutions and markets. Critiques of
development economics, such as Easterly’s, argue that the universalism applied in development
policies is a continuation of the colonial civilizing mission.
It is important to recognize the similarities between colonial policies and paternalistic
development policies today, both generally and in the case of Greenland. Greenland’s
contemporary struggle for sovereignty is complex. Greenland’s desire for complete sovereignty
depends, in part, on their economy’s ability to sustain itself independently from Denmark.
However, there are also more nuanced questions of being able to reconfigure Greenlandic
identity independent from Denmark. As Grydehøj (2016) writes “Greenland’s colonial
experience has trapped it in a Denmark-oriented conceptualisation of Greenlandic identity, which
prevents the pursuit of potential political and economic futures”. The distinction between
independence and dependence is not clear cut and in light of continuing influence from
Denmark, it is important to emphasize that this distinction should be defined in Greenland.
Although I have tried to get a Greenlandic perspective on how Greenlanders imagine their post-
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colonial identity, most academic writing about Greenland comes from Danish or
Danish/Greenlandic scholars. More input from Greenland is needed. It is also important to pay
attention to the perception of Greenlandic identity in Denmark and I would argue that creating
greater awareness about Greenland’s colonial history in Denmark may help Greenland’s
continuing struggle for sovereignty. The block grant is good example of the complexity of
continuing ‘help’ from Denmark. Although politicians on both sides would like to see the end of
this grant, Greenland’s economy relies on it and would not be able to sustain itself without it.
However, I argue that a tangible improvement would be changing Danish perceptions of the
block grant from being a charitable donation, to being an investment. It is unrealistic to suggest
that Denmark will play no part in shaping Greenland, but hopefully Danish politicians can learn
from looking back on the history of Denmark’s relationship to Greenland and attempt to raise
Greenlandic viewpoints on the continuing struggle for sovereignty, rather than impose
paternalistic policies. For Gad (2014), it is helpful to look at the ways in which Denmark’s
colonial project has harmed Greenland, but he argues that we must do so without underplaying
Greenland’s capabilities today by victimizing Greenlanders. Gad argues that careful, thoughtful
discussions of Greenland’s history and contemporary struggles and aspirations can help
Greenland to place itself as “both a victim of past Danish sovereignty games and an important
player in future Arctic sovereignty games” (p. 112).
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Appendix

Appendix 1: Urbanization, Colonization and Suicide Rates; Preliminary Results
Where columns (1) and (3) are random effects and (2) and (4) are fixed effects. Ulag1 is the urbanization
rate (% of population living in an urban area) for year t-1, col is the colonizing dummy, collagurban is the
interactive term between the colonzing dummy and the urbanization rate (col x Ulag1), lngdplag is the
log of GDP per capita for year t-1 and unemployment is the unemployment rate.
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